Wednesday, May 30, 2012


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Benefits of IP-Holding Company


PATENTS
There are compelling business reasons for consolidating IP assets. Typical reasons for establishing intellectual property (IP) holding companies include:-
(i)                  Tax planning,
(ii)                Protection in the event of insolvency, and
(iii)               Administrative synergies, such as consolidation of legal costs.
(iv)              Centralizing of control of IP assets enabling the business to effectively manage its IP[1].
(v)         Centralized management allows the company to effectively monitor, protect and enforce its IP rights.
TAX BENEFITS
Intellectual property is often the principal source of value and revenue for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. To lessen the tax burden, companies should consider whether to place their intellectual property rights in a holding company outside India(country in which parent company is registered). IP Holding companies can be established in Switzerland, Netherlands and Cayman Islands[2] etc.
image from here: signupandmakemoney.com
The offshore holding company then grants a license to the parent company or other third parties in exchange for royalty payments. The goal, of course, is to minimize the parent company’s tax burden and limit taxation on revenue. Not only should the royalties generated by this offshore subsidiary be tax-free, but also generally the profits made abroad aren’t taxable in India until they’ve been repatriated[3].
The problem arises in fair pricing of taxes. For e.g. the Indian Government would want subsidiaries of domestic companies to pay very high royalty rates to the domestic companies for the use of intellectual property; because this would obviously bring cash flow to the parent company, and, as a result, tax revenue. At the same time, overseas governments would want royalty rate paid to the Indian parent company to be minimal; for the same reason that it would reduce the amount of outflows being paid by the overseas subsidiary in form of royalty rates, hence retaining more income in their own country and generating furthermore tax revenue for host country.

OTHER BENEFITS
image from here: drscoundrels.com
Apart from the Tax benefits the company saves on, the creation of IP Holding Company also increases the corporate efficiency in the operation of the business, by a strong regime of ownership, the separate entity provides a centralized and specific management of IP assets throughout and helps exploitation of IP assets financially, in broader terms we can say it’s like outsourcing your IP management affairs to a subsidiary company which will specifically deal with IP management and provide greater fruitful results. Secondly by assigning the intangible assets to the IP Holding Company the appointment of its (IP Holding Company) Officers and Directors would insulate Officers and Directors of the Parent Co. from involvement in the prosecution of lawsuits involving the IP. Also the Ip Holding is saved from expenditure due to claims of the parent company’s creditors, and the parent’s insolvency. It might also protect the IP from hostile takeovers of the parent company which could mean that in case the Parent company goes bankrupt the owner still has an opportunity to re-establish his company through the IP-Holding company.
Placing IP in a separate holding company may also ease objectifying and determining value of the IP assets, separate from the operations and goodwill of the parent. This may be of particular importance for obtaining financing and eventually selling the IP to a third party. 

TRADEMARKS
The Mobility of Trademarks
Some of the trademark rights are mobile (like use of trademark in other countries, Licensing etc.), and others are less mobile (based on the laws of the particular country the Parent company exists in). All of those are more or less based in one or the country at some point of time, but it will not affect the trademark owner for, the owner can be located anywhere on the planet, and still exercise effective control. As a result, the choice of the location of the owner of such rights and location of his IP holding company becomes driven by other factors, of which the primacy is held by the taxation policies[4] under which the owner and any licensee operate, whether there is a withholding in any royalty payments by the local tax authorities, and whether a reasonable infrastructure exists to support a trademark holding company. Often companies prefer countries which do not have very industrialized economy but should have well- structured laws, like the few nations of European Union, or developing nations of Africa.
Ballarpur Industries, Crompton Greaves, NIIT, HCL Technologies, ONGC Videsh, Jubilant Organosys, Infosys, Wipro, Satyam and iGate? These are some of the Indian companies that have set up, or are in the process of setting up, operations in the Netherlands. Also we can take the example of McDonald’s Corporation. It owns a number of famous trademarks, design rights, copyright and know-how which it utilizes in its own outlets and licenses to its franchisees. This gives the company at least three sources of income: by operating as a restaurateur; by supplying products to its owned and licensed restaurants; and by licensing rights to its franchise operations.
However, favourable locations are not open to all; they are the preserve of the actual or putative multinational, as only Multi-national Companies with huge revenues to incur the cost of broadening the affairs and managing abroad affairs have legitimate reason to locate its trademark rights anywhere other than where it carries on business. For the structuring of trademark rights, this means an operation which conducts business in at least two countries.
Once that occurs, especially efficient structuring becomes possible. Though this does not in any way mean that IP holding does not benefit Mid-sized companies or large companies involved only in domestic affairs since where only one country is involved, proper structuring to put all of the trademark rights into one place is good practice, as it leads to the ability to securitize the resultant royalty stream which can be created through a specially set up licensing vehicle and can still come in handy in availing tax-benefits.
The Trademark Rights should be consolidated and structured in one place.
The rights which affect trademarks are interlinked, and conflicting ownership creates limitations and if the companies are working on Arm’s length[5] basis, sometimes it might create the possibility of mutually overlapping injunctions that is the seeds of mutually assured destruction. 

Related Case Law
Federal Circuit of United States held that the plaintiff corporation was not entitled to claim damages for the profits lost by its sister corporation.[6] In that case, the plaintiff owned the patent, but licensed it on a non-exclusive basis to its sister corporation, which sold goods that competed with the infringing goods. The plaintiff argued that it operated with its sister as a single economic unit for purposes of producing, marketing and selling the patented products and shared a unity of interest that justified treating them as a single economic unit for a lost-profits analysis. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, pointedly noting that the companies would have to live with the consequences of their separate corporate status.
Conclusion
We can conclude that the primary advantages of Intra-group Licensing are Tax evasion, better legal command and control and royalty but on the other hand there is the disadvantage of less royalty coming into the company, for example in the German case quoted above the subsidiary branch did not have to pay any amount for around 6 years after that also they paid only around 1.5 percent of the sales.



[1] It provides the companies with the knowledge to evaluate the strength and weaknesses of its IP portfolio so that it can make well-informed decisions about whether for e.g., it should be increasing holdings in certain areas or expanding its market through licensing.
[2] There are no taxes in the Cayman Islands – government revenue comes from indirect taxes such as customs duties, stamp duty and annual fees levied on corporations.
[3] Though the recent Vodafone taxation case has changed the scenario, but the governments stand is still to be made clear on this issue.
[4] Government on Vodafone case: Can’t let India become tax haven. (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Government-on-Vodafone-case-Cant-let-India-become-tax-haven/articleshow/12310019.cms)
[5] A transaction in which the buyers and sellers of a product act independently and have no relationship to each other. The concept of an arm's length transaction is to ensure that both parties in the deal are acting in their own self interest and are not subject to any pressure or duress from the other party.
[6] Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Technology, Inc., 383 F.3d 1303, 1310-12 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

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Tuesday, May 29, 2012

Section 90(Terms And Conditions Of Compulsory Licenses) Natco Pharma Ltd. Vs. Bayer Corporation


Introduction
"In August 2011, Natco[1], an Indian generic manufacturer, had applied for a “compulsory licence” in respect of Bayer’s patent covering an anticancer drug, Sorafenib tosylate, meant for patients with advanced kidney and liver cancer.
Controller General of Patents P.H. Kurian found that all the grounds prescribed in Section 84 of the Indian Patents Act for the issuance of a compulsory licence had been met:
image from here : http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/
One, Bayer[2] supplied the drug to hardly 2 per cent of approximately 88,000 patients who required the drug. Therefore, the “reasonable requirements” of the public with respect to the patented drug (Nexavar) were clearly not met.
Two, Bayer’s pricing of the drug was excessive and did not constitute a “reasonably affordable” price. It charged Rs 2.8 lakh for a month’s supply of the drug, whereas Natco was willing to supply the same quantity at Rs 8,800 a month.
Three, since Bayer did not manufacture reasonable quantities of the drug in India, it could not be said to have complied with the “working” requirement under the Indian Patents Act.
The objective of this project is to analysis the above mentioned issues alongside an understanding of “Compulsory licenses” in general, also attempt has been made to analyze laws relating to other developed and developing countries.



The Patentee
M/s.BayerCorporation,100 Bayer Road, Pittsburg, PA15205·9741, USA ( hereinafter referred to as 'patentee'), an internationally renowned manufacturer of innovative drugs, invented a drug called 'Sorafenib' (Carboxy Substituted Diphenyl Ureas) useful in the treatment of advanced stage liver and kidney cancer in the 1990s.
The Applicant
Natco Pharma Ltd. filed an Application for Compulsory License (hereinafter referred to as the "Application") on 29.07.2011 under Section 84(1)[3] of The Patents Act 1970 in respect of the Patent No.215758. The Applicant being a leading manufacturer and distributor of various drugs in India approached the Patentee with a request for a voluntary license to manufacture and sell the drug, which did not materialize.
The Application and Initial Developments.
The Applicant filed an Application for Compulsory License[4] on 29.07.2011 under Section84(1) of The Patents Act 1970[5] r/w Rule 96 of the Patent Rules 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules") in respect of the Patent No. 215758. The Applicant being a leading manufacturer and distributor of various drugs in India approached the Patentee with a request for a voluntary license to manufacture and sell the drug, which did not materialize. The Applicant proposed to sell the drug at a price of Rs.8800/-for one month therapy as compared to the price of about Rs. 2,SO,428/, which was being charged by the Patentee at the time of making the Application. Three years had lapsed since the date of grant of patent when the Application was filed.
Thereafter the Applicant served a copy of the Application upon Patentee and the Application was published in the official journal published on 12th August, 2011, the Patentee filed a request seeking an extension of time by one month to file the notice of opposition and the same was allowed. The Patentee then filed an ‘Interlocutory Injunction’ with regard to an infringement suit against the applicant in the high court which was refused. Here it is Important to state that in US were the US Supreme Court was praised for giving "judges much-needed flexibility in granting or denying permanent injunctions."[6] The evolving doctrine under eBay v. Merc Exchange places the U.S. closer to legal traditions in Europe and Japan, where governments and courts have the authority to issue compulsory licenses in a wide range of cases, including those involving uses of dependent patents, refusals to license, and to more generally protect the public interest. The court stated that:-
 To get an injunction, a patent owner must show the court:
    1). That it has suffered an irreparable injury;
    2). That other possible legal remedies, including the payment of royalties, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
    3). That considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
    4) That the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
Meanwhile Patentee filed a writ petition challenging the above mentioned order which was refused as well.
Patentee's submissions:
The Patentee made the following submissions.
“Estimated incidence for kidney cancer in India as per GLOBOCAN 2008 is 8900 patients and mortality is 5733 patients, which accounts 64.4 % of total patients. Of the 8900 patients of kidney cancer around 90 % account for RCC, which equals to approximately 8010 patients. Around one third (33.33%) of the initially diagnosed RCC patients are affected with the stage IV disease (33.33% of 8010 = 2669). This means there are approximately 5341 stageI, II, 1II patients, and about 2669 stage IV patients. In 25 % of patients having surgical resection for localized disease (stage I, II and III ) with acurativeintent, recurrence occurs (25 % of 5341= 1335). These1335 Patients ( from stage I, II and III) eventually may progress to stage IV RCC. Therefore, the total number of patients falling under stage IV of R.C.C is approximately 2669 + 1335 = 4004 patients. The total number of patients with RCC, entitled for treatment with the drug is approximately 4004. Patentees further argued that the total number of patients of HCC entitled for treatment with the drug is approximately 4838 .The total number of patients eligible for the drug are 4004 (R.C.C) and 4838 (H.C.C) i.e. a total of 8842. Alternative treatments are also available to the patients.”
There were other contentions which were not accepted by the Controller.
·         It was contended that the requirements of Sec 84(6) (iv)[7]were not fulfilled.
·         The Patentee also contended that that controller ought not to have passed an order under 87(1)[8] of the Act without giving the patentee an opportunity to be heard in the matter. The controller found that the patentee had not imported the drug at all and in 2009 and 2010 in small quantities.[9]
·         There last contention was that the applicant had concealed the fact that Cipla had been supplying the generic drug earlier and that the application should be refused on this ground.
Applicant's submissions
The applicant alleged that there were ~20,000 liver cancer patients and ~9,000 kidney cancer patients (the populations that benefit from the drug), and that assuming 80% demand there would be a need for about 23,000 bottles of the drug per month to satisfy the demand.  The facts (albeit disputed by Bayer) presented showed no bottles imported into India in 2008, ~200 bottles in 2009 and that there was no evidence for import in 2010.  The significance of these dates and amounts are that the Indian government granted Bayer a patent on the active pharmaceutical ingredient in Nexavar in 2008, and the Controller assessed Bayer's behavior in fulfilling the "reasonable requirements of the public" during that time.  It was also significant that Bayer did not produce the drug in India, explaining the focus on bottles of imported drug.  The Controller's decision mentioned that failure to manufacture the drug in India was evidence that Bayer had not "taken adequate steps to . . . make full use of the invention."[10]
The applicant alleged that there were ~20,000 liver cancer patients and ~9,000 kidney cancer patients (the populations that benefit from the drug), and that assuming 80% demand there would be a need for about 23,000 bottles of the drug per month to satisfy the demand.  The facts (albeit disputed by Bayer) presented showed no bottles imported into India in 2008, ~200 bottles in 2009 and that there was no evidence for import in 2010.  The significance of these dates and amounts are that the Indian government granted Bayer a patent on the active pharmaceutical ingredient in Nexavar in 2008, and the Controller assessed Bayer's behavior in fulfilling the "reasonable requirements of the public" during that time.  It was also significant that Bayer did not produce the drug in India, explaining the focus on bottles of imported drug.  The Controller's decision mentioned that failure to manufacture the drug in India was evidence that Bayer had not "taken adequate steps to . . . make full use of the invention."
On the other Hand Bayer argued that sales of another Indian generic company, Cipla, should be taken into account in determining whether the Indian market was being reasonably satisfied.
Bayer also made the patently correct argument that the cost of drugs supports the pipeline of future drug development and that Bayer “continued to invest major sums into further development of Sorafenib” for treating other cancer types.  Bayer emphasized that its investment in new drug development amounted to 8 billion Euros from 2007 to date, and that it takes more than 2 million Euros to bring a new drug to market. 

Issues Involved.
MEANING OF REASONABLY AFFORDABLE PRICE

Reasonably Affordable Price
 According to Section 84(1)(b) of the India Patent Act, any person may make an application to the Controller for a compulsory license on a patent, if “the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price.”

In determining whether a price is “reasonably affordable,” one can consider different standards for different types of goods. For a drug for cancer treatments, India should be guided by the standards set out in the 2001 World Trade Organization (WTO) Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health, which I will refer to here simply as the “Doha Declaration.” Paragraph  4 of the Doha Declaration is an agreement among all of the WTO members, including India.

It says:
  “We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.”

The Doha Declaration says “the TRIPS Agreement . . . should be interpreted and implemented in a manner . . . to promote access to medicines for all,” and WTO members have the right “to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS agreement, which provided flexibility for this purpose.” Under the Doha Declaration, governments have an obligation to grant compulsory licenses, when the prices are so high that “access to medicine for all” is not possible.

To determine if Sorafenib is reasonably affordable in India, various issues and factors were taken into account, including in particular:
·         The incomes of patients,
·         The availability of third party insurance or reimbursements,
·         and the empirical evidence regarding access.


IMPORTANCE OF DOHA DECLARATION OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH
The Doha Declaration of the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was a major victory for developing countries that wished to make TRIPS more amenable to "public health" concerns. Amongst other things, this Declaration reiterated the flexibilities of a member state to avail of a compulsory license to manufacture cheaper versions of patented drugs. A compulsory license entails granting permission (without the consent of the patent owner) to a third party to manufacture cheaper versions of the drug question.

In other words, Natco can manufacture Roche's drug, without Roche's consent (in most cases, under a royalty rate fixed by a government authority). And since Natco does not bear any R&D cost but only the manufacturing cost, the drug produced under the compulsory license will almost always be cheaper than the patented drug. It is important to note that TRIPS provides great flexibility for a member state to deploy "compulsory licensing" provisions.


LOCAL WORKING REQUIREMENTS
The relevance of 'local working requirements' in the compulsory licensing debate: The relevance of this debate on the local working requirements, is that most of big Pharmaceutical manufacturing happens in its home countries, with very few of them having any local manufacturing capacity in India. Therefore if the Patents Act, 1970 is interpreted to require local working, all most all pharmaceutical patents granted to foreign manufacturers are liable for compulsory licensing. The main issues which need to be examined in this context are threefold and are as follows:
(i)Whether a 'local working' requirement is TRIPs compatible?
(ii)Whether the Indian Patent Act requires patents to be 'locally worked'?
(iii)The economics of the international trade in pharmaceutical products and whether a 'local working' requirement would result in the lowest possible prices for the consumers?


(i) Whether a 'local working' requirement is TRIPs compatible?
At first glance TRIPs seems to provide a straight forward answer, to the question of 'local working', in Article 27.1. Although Article 27 is titled 'Patentable Subject Matter' it concludes by stating that patent rights will be enjoyed without discrimination as to whether a product is imported or produced locally. It would seem that this would obviate the need for a debate on the subject but things are seldom so simple when it comes to real life. An excellent article authored by Paul Champ & Amir Attaran which is published in the Yale Journal of International Law (YJIL) provides an in-depth look into the question of TRIPs compatibility. In the YJIL article the authors go through the entire negotiating history of the TRIPs agreement and point out how the same is inconclusive in establishing whether or not the member states actually wanted the insertion of a 'local working requirement'. The authors then end the paper by examining the local working requirement from the perspective of Articles 30 & 31 of TRIPs and conclude that Articles 30 & 31 of TRIPs permit members states to maintain a 'local working' requirement. Articles 30 & 31 of TRIPs are the same provisions used by developing countries to defend the presence of compulsory licensing provisions in their intellectual property laws.
In the year 2000 the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO clarified this question when the U.S.A filed a complaint against Brazil for having a local working requirement in its patent law. At that time India had joined the dispute as an interested party. Unfortunately for the U.S.A. it turned out that one of their legislation had a similar provision for local working of all federally funded innovations. As a result the U.S.A. beat a hasty retreat and withdrew from the dispute, reserving its right to re-start the litigation.
(ii) Whether the Indian Patent Act requires patents to be 'locally worked'?
Section 84 (c) of the Patent Act states a compulsory license may be granted if the applicant can prove that the patentee has worked the patent invention in the territory of India. Although the Act is silent on the definition of 'working' it does lay down certain other provisions from which it can be determined as to whether or not local working is required:
The two provisions that touch on the topic of local working/importation are:
(i)Section 83 (b) [General principles applicable to working of patented inventions] that they [patents] are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the patented article;
(ii)Section 84 (7)(e) [Defining when the Reasonable Requirements of the public are not met] if the working of the patented invention in the territory of India on a commercial scale is being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented article.

The first provision i.e. S. 83 (b) is quite unique for an Indian legislation since it is clearing not binding and is more in the nature of a guiding principle. If the provision was meant to be binding Parliament would have drafted the language of the same to reflect the rigidity of the provision. Such non-binding, merely guiding principles of law are not entirely alien to Indian law. The Constitution of India has a set of Directive Principles of State Policy which lays out the socio-economic goals for the country but which are not binding and are therefore non-justiciable.

The second provision i.e. S. 84 (7)(e) is a sub-clause to the Section which defines the circumstances in which the law deems the reasonable requirements of the public to have not been met. According to this Section the reasonable requirement of the public are deemed to have not been met when the working of the patented invention in the territory of India on a commercial scale is being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented article. Reading of this provision suggests that this provision is applicable in only those circumstances when an applicant can establish that the sole reason for the inadequate availability of the patented invention within India is the fact that it is being imported i.e. to say the process of importation is in itself leading to the shortage of the patented invention in India. The process of importation could be impeded by a variety of reasons such as natural disasters, socio-economic reasons in the exporting country, political reasons such as sanctions imposed by a foreign country wherein the manufacturing plants of the patentee are situated. To very briefly summarize this point – Section 84(7)(e) will not be initiated, in those cases where importation is not hindering the working of the patented invention in India either in terms of cost or availability. Instead S. 84(7) (e) will kick in only in those circumstances when the process of importation is preventing or hindering the working of the product within India in terms of cost or availability. The test therefore lies in whether or not, there lies a direct co-relation, between the cost/availability of the product and the fact that the same is imported. Therefore a pharmaceutical company which imports the patented product into India from Europe or the U.S.A. and sells the same in India cannot be held to have not met the reasonable requirements of the Indian public unless an applicant can prove that the process of importation is adversely affecting the working of the product in terms of either cost or availability.

(iii) The economics of the international trade in pharmaceutical products and whether a 'local working' requirement would result in the lowest possible prices for the consumers?
There is one basic economic concept that is relevant to the discussion on whether a 'local working' requirement is in the best interests of the consumers and that is the concept of 'economies of scale'.
Economies of scale: This concept basically refers to the advantages that accrue to a business and the consumer if the business were to manufacture a product on a large scale. Basically a company achieves economies of scale when its per unit cost decreases for every extra unit manufactured. This usually happens due to the increase in manufacturing capacity which in turn facilitates the more efficient use of resources. To give a simple example – if a company were to manufacture 100 units of a product it would have to price each unit at a cost which would be higher than if it were to manufacture 1000 units in order to make similar profits.
“The Hindu” stated that Economies of scale apply in particular to the pharmaceutical industry. Take for example Cipla, which is one of India's largest pharmaceutical companies. With a mere 8 manufacturing plants, located in India, Cipla is able to sell products worth Rs. 5000 crores (including exports of Rs.2743 crores to over 180 countries worldwide). It is presumable that foreign pharmaceutical companies which have already established their manufacturing plants in their home countries will be able to achieve similar economies of scale with their existing plants. To establish new plants in India just to meet local working requirement will disrupt the economies of scale that they are able to achieve through their present manufacturing plants. If in case these economies of scale were to be disrupted the cost per unit would escalate. In short a 'local working requirement' under the Patent Act would in fact lead to an increase in the cost of patent pharmaceutical products in India.

REASONABLE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC:
According to section 90 of Indian Patents Act when reasonable requirements of the public deemed not satisfied:
For the purposes of sections 84, 86 and 89, the reasonable requirements of the public shall be deemed not to have been satisfied -
 (a) if, by reason of the default of the patentee to manufacture in India to an adequate extent and supply on reasonable terms the patented article or a part of the patented article which is necessary for its efficient working or if, by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a licence or licences on reasonable terms, -
(i) an existing trade or industry or the development thereof or the establishment of any new trade or industry in India or the trade or industry of any person or classes of persons trading or manufacturing in India is prejudiced; or
(ii) the demand for the patented article is not being met to an adequate extent or on reasonable terms from manufacture in India; or
(iii) a market for the export of the patented article manufactured in India is not being supplied or developed; or
(iv) the establishment or development of commercial activities in India is prejudiced; or
  (b) if, by reason of conditions imposed by the patentee (whether before or after the commencement of this Act) upon the grant of licences under the patent, or upon the purchase, hire or use of the patented article or process, the manufacture, use or sale of materials not protected by the patent, or the establishment or development of any trade or industry in India, is prejudiced; or
(c) if the patented invention is not being worked in India on a commercial scale to an adequate extent or is not being so worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable; or
(d) if the demand for the patented article in India is being met to a substantial extent by importation from abroad by -
(i) the patentee or persons claiming under him; or
(ii) persons directly or indirectly purchasing from him; or
(iii) other persons against whom the patentee is not taking or has not taken proceedings for infringement; or
(e) if the working of the patented invention in India on a commercial scale is being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented article by the patentee or the other persons referred to in the preceding clause.

PROVISIONS OF REASONABLE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PUBLIC AUSTRALIAN PATENTS ACT 1990 - SECT 135
Reasonable requirements of the public
Though reasonability has not been specifically defined in the act Sec 1(1) provides to manufacture the patented product to an adequate extent, and supply it on reasonable terms.
(ii)  to manufacture, to an adequate extent, a part of the patented product that is necessary for the efficient working of the product, and supply the part on reasonable terms; or
(iii)  to carry on the patented process to a reasonable extent; or
(iv)  to grant licences on reasonable term.



Contentions of NATCO with regard to “Reasonable Requirement Of Public”:

Natco urged that as per GLOBOCAN 2008 there were 20,000 patients of liver cancer and 8,900 cases of kidney cancer in India. Assuming 80% of patients needed the Drug, approximately 23,000 patients required the treatment. According to the Form 27x filed by Bayer, they imported 0 units in 2008 and approximately 200 bottles in 2009 and 0 units in 2010. Hence, the reasonable demand was not being met. Bayer does not manufacture the Drug in India, but imports it. It is exorbitantly priced, usually out of stock and available only in pharmacies attached to few hospitals in metro cities. Bayer launched the product worldwide in 2006 and made thumping sales to the tune of 2,454 million dollars. Thus, the insignificant number of bottles imported in India showed Bayer’s neglectful conduct. Cipla’s infringing sales have no bearing as a civil suit is pending against them and any time they can be injuncted thereby stopping their manufacture and sale.
Bayer responded by demonstrating that actual number of patients of kidney and liver cancer requiring treatment is 8,842 and not 23,000. The Drug was being made available by Bayer to all cancer treatment centers in India. Exorbitant price has no link with reasonable requirement of the public. Sec 84 (7) of the Act lays down several deeming conditions as to what constitutes “reasonable requirement of the public has not been met”. None of these deeming conditions have anything to do with price of the patented product. The availability of the Drug has been considerably increased due to sales by Cipla. Cipla was projected to sell about 4,686 boxes of the Drug in 2012.
The Controller decided against Bayer.

 Observations of the Controller:
 The number of patients needing the Drug will be much higher than 8,842.  As per Bayer’s own numbers they have been able to supply the Drug to not more than 200 patients which is a mere 2% of the 8,842 patients who according to Bayer’s own estimate need the Drug. Bayer’s conduct was not justifiable as it was already marketing the drug worldwide since 2006, it had all drug approvals in place as well as considerable field force.
The Controller did not deal with the issue whether expensive price of the Drug has any connection with it being reasonably unavailable to the public.

What is the “Reasonable requirement of public?
Section 84 (7) provides deeming provisions in relation to reasonable requirement of public.[11] It provides for certain situations when it would be deemed that RRP is not satisfied. Apart from the demand of patented product not being met, it also contemplates situations where (i) export market for patented product is not developed;
 (ii) Working of patented product on commercial scale in India is prevented / hindered by importation of such product.
 Thus RRP is intended to mean not only the demand for product but also development of the trade in India. In the present matter, Natco relied on one fact of market demand not being met by Bayer’s sales (Section 84 (7) (a) (ii)).

What is the requirement?
Bayer did not challenge reliance by Natco on the GLOBOCAN 2008 data but relied on other factors such as percentage of patients having Stage IV (as opposed to Stages I to III) or advanced stage cancer to arrive at number of patients needing the Drug to be 8,842. The Controller concluded that the number of patients must he higher than 8,842. It appears that even if the Controller had proceeded on the number provided by Bayer, the admitted supply by Bayer was not sufficient to meet the demand. By its own showing, more than 8,000 patients need the Drug, whereas Bayer has imported 200 bottles in 2009 and 593 bottles in 2011. According to oncologists, each patient needs from one tablet a day to three tablets a day. Each pack has 120 tablets. Hence Bayer’s import of 593 bottles in 2011 could have met the needs of a minimum of 200 patients to a maximum of 2,400 patients.”



Court’s Decision
The Controller's decision, in favor of granting a compulsory license, was based on his determination that the question of whether a drug was available at a "reasonably affordable price has to be construed predominantly with reference to the public" and under the "admitted facts" of this case these considerations fell in favor of granting the license.
The Controller also considered the fact that Bayer did not "work" the invention in India.  Here, the law was construed with regard to whether the invention was worked "to the fullest extent possible" and here it clearly was not (upon evidence that Bayer had "worked" the patented invention "extensively" in other countries while having the industrial capacity to work the patent, i.e., produce Nexavar®, in india).  "Minimal" working is not enough, according to Natco, while Bayer argued that the extent of working a patented invention depends on the invention and, for Nexavar® the "small global demand" justifies the "strategic decision" to make the drug in Germany.
In making his decision, the Controller noted that the term "worked in the territory of India" had not been defined in the Indian Patent Act, and so he needed to construe the term with regard to "various International Conventions and Agreements in intellectual property," the 1970 Patent Act and the legislative history.  But the Controller seemed more interested in addressing the "crucial argument" of the patentee that the applicant's construction of the term was incorrect because the phrase "default of the patentee to manufacture in India to an adequate extent and supply on reasonable terms the patented article" was deleted from the Act.  He decided that this was "one face of the coin," but that the other was that the phrase was deleted from Section 84(1)(a) with regard to the patented article being "reasonable available to the public" in favor of Section 84(1)(c) which "was made a separate ground for grant of a compulsory license."
In this light, the Controller considered the relevant provisions of the Paris Convention, the TRIPS agreement and the Indian Patents Act of 1970 and decided that the combination of Article 27(1) of TRIPS and Article 5(1)(A) of the Paris Convention supported an interpretation that failure to manufacture Nexavar® in India supported the grant of a compulsory license to Natco (which it termed "reasonable fetter" on Bayer's patent rights).  Ultimately, however, the Controller found ample justification for the compulsory license in Section 83(b) of the Patent Act, which states that "[p]atents are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for importation of the patented article" and Section 83(c) that "the grant of a patent right must contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology."  Coupled with the provisions of Section 83(f) that a patent should not be abused, the Controller construed Indian patent law to require that a patentee work a patented invention in India or license another do to so.
After refusing to adjourn the proceedings based on Section 86 of the law (finding, inter alia, that Bayer had not established any justifiable reason for its "delay" in working the patent in India), the Controller established the terms of the compulsory license, wherein:
1.      The right to make and sell sorafenib is limited to applicant (no sublicensing).
2.      The compulsorily licensed drug product can be sold only for treatment of liver and renal  cancer;
3.       The royalty shall be paid at a rate of 6%.
4.      The price is set at Rs.74/- per tablet, which equals Rs. 8,800/- per month;
5.      The applicant commits to provide the drug for free to at least 600 "needy and deserving" patients per year.
6.      The compulsory license is not assignable and non-exclusive, with no right to import the drug.
7.      No right for the licensee to "represent publicly or privately" that its product is te same as Bayer's Nexavar.
8.      Bayer has no liability for Natco's drug product, which must be physically distinct from Bayer's dosage form.



Compulsory Licensing
Now that we have considered all the relevant issues relating to compulsory Licensing in this present case lets contemplate on Compulsory Licensing and its relevance with regard to Developing Countries. One of the most important aspects of Indian Patents Act, 1970, is compulsory licensing of the patent subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions. At any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the sealing of a patent, any person interested may make an application to the Controller of Patents for grant of compulsory license of the patent, subject to the fulfillment of following conditions, i.e.
  • the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied; or
  • that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonable price; or
  • that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India.
It is further important to note that an application for compulsory licensing may be made by any person notwithstanding that he is already the holder of a license under the patent.
For the purpose of compulsory licensing, no person can be stopped from alleging that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention are not satisfied or that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonable price by reason of any admission made by him, whether in such a license or by reason of his having accepted such a license.
The Controller, if satisfied that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied or that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonable price, may order the patentee to grant a licence upon such terms as he may deem fit. However, before the grant of a compulsory license, the Controller of Patents shall take into account following factors:
  • The nature of invention;
  • The time elapsed, since the sealing of the patent;
  • The measures already taken by the patentee or the licensee to make full use of the invention;
  • The ability of the applicant to work the invention to the public advantage;
  • The capacity of the applicant to undertake the risk in providing capital and working the invention, if the application for compulsory license is granted;
  • As to the fact whether the applicant has made efforts to obtain a license from the patentee on reasonable terms and conditions;
  • National emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency;
  • Public non commercial use;
  • Establishment of a ground of anti competitive practices adopted by the patentee.
The grant of compulsory license cannot be claimed as a matter of right, as the same is subject to the fulfillment of above conditions and discretion of the Controller of Patents. Further judicial recourse is available against any arbitrary or illegal order of the Controller of Patents for grant of compulsory license.

Policy with regard to compulsory licenses in U.S:
2006: Voda v. Cordis Corporation[12]
In a 2006 case, Dr. Jan K. Voda alleged that three patents concerning an angioplasty guide catheter were infringed by Cordis (a Johnson and Johnson company). A jury found for Dr. Voda on infringement (though it did not find willfulness), and determined that he was entitled to a reasonable royalty of 7.5% of Cordis’ gross sales of the infringing catheters. Finding that Dr. Voda failed to demonstrate either irreparable injury or that monetary damages would be inadequate, the court denied his request for a permanent injunction. The denial of the injunction was affirmed on appeal (536 F.3d 1311).

2007: Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs[13]

In 2007, Innogenetics brought suit in Wisconsin against Abbott Laboratories alleging that Abbott had infringed its patent for a method of genotyping the hepatitis C virus, marketed in the form of diagnostic test kits. The jury found that the patent had indeed been infringed, and, based on a consideration of a hypothetical negotiation for a license, it determined that Abbott should pay $7 million, which included a running royalty of 5 to 10 euros per test sold up until that time. The court evaluated Innogentic’s motion for injunctive relief by evaluating the eBay factors, finding that the public interest favored the denial of a permanent injunction, but that all other factors cut in favor of granting it. The court therefore granted the injunction. On appeal in 2008, however, the Federal Circuit vacated this injunction. Additionally, it found that the $7 million verdict was not a royalty limited only to Abbott’s past infringement, saying: “The reasonable royalties awarded to Innogenetics include an upfront entry fee that contemplates or is based upon future sales by Abbott in a long term market. When a patentee requests and receives such compensation, it cannot be heard to complain that it will be irreparably harmed by future sales.”

2009: Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates[14]

In a 2009 case, patentee Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. sued W.L. Gore & Associates in Arizona for infringement of a patent for a prosthetic vascular graft. Finding infringement, the jury awarded Bard $185,589,871.02, accounting for both lost profits and including a 10% reasonable royalty rate. The court denied Bard’s motion for a permanent injunction, holding that a compulsory license was appropriate compensation; it wrote: “The Court is satisfied that a fair and full amount of compensatory money damages, when combined with a progressive compulsory license, will adequately compensate Plaintiffs' injuries, such that the harsh and extraordinary remedy of injunction-with its potentially devastating public health consequences--can be avoided” (emphasis in original).

2009: Medtronic Somafor Danek USA, Inc. v. Globus Med., Inc.[15]

The fourth example was in a 2009 Pennsylvania infringement action between patentee Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc. and Globus Medical, Inc. concerning a dispute over patents pertaining to devices and methods used by spinal surgeons to stabilize bony structures, manufactured and marketed by Medtronic in a commercial embodiment called the “Sextant System,” and by Globus as the “Pivot System.” A jury found the patents infringed. Following unsuccessful settlement discussions, the parties agreed to a bench trial on the matter of damages and injunctive relief. The court refused to grant an injunction, and determined that a royalty rate of 15% of Globus’ sales would be applied to a royalty base of $13,901,795, resulting in a reasonable royalty of $2,085,269.20, plus prejudgment interest.
Relevant Cases in Other Developed and Developing Countries
China
In 2005, China used the threat to a compulsory license to obtain voluntary licenses to manufacture generic Tamiflu.
Indonesia[16]
On October 5, 2004, Indonesia issued a government use compulsory license to manufacture generic versions of two HIV-AIDS drugs, Lamivudine and Nevirapine, until the end of the patent term in 2011 and 2012 respectively. The license includes a royalty rate of 0.5% of the net selling value[35]. Production of the ARVs has started by PT Kimia Farma. In March 2007, Indonesia reportedly issued a compulsory license for patents on the AIDS drug Efavirenz.
Malaysia[17]
On September 29, 2004, the Malaysian Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs issued a two-year government use compulsory license to import from India didanosine (ddI), zidovudine (AZT) and lamivudine+zidovidine (Combivir). The Ministry of Health proposed a royalty rate of 4% of the value of the generic product.
Taiwan
On July 26, 2004, the Taiwan Intellectual Property Office (TIPO) issued a compulsory license to Gigastorage for 5 patents related to CD-R of Phillips. The term of the license is through the expiration of the patent terms.
In November 2005, Taiwan issued a compulsory license for patents needed to manufacture and sell generic versions of Tamiflu. According to this report by Deutsche Presse-Agentur dpa:
The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) granted compulsory licensing to Taiwan pharmaceutical companies after talks with Roche and Gilead Science - the U.S. developer of Tamiflu - broke down. 'Roche and Gilead insisted they can supply enough Tamiflu if bird flu erupts in Taiwan. Our argument was: When there is a bird flu pandemic, millions of people will be hospitalized or dead, and some countries might confiscate Tamiflu or ban its export. We cannot gamble our people's lives on their unreliable promise,' Lai Chin-hsiang, secretary-general of the Department of Health (DOH), told Deutsche Presse-Agentur dpa. Under the compulsory license, valid until December 31, 2007, Taiwan drug firms can make Tamiflu for domestic use and should use it only when there is a shortage of supply from Roche.
Ghana
In October 2005, the Minister of Health issued a government use compulsory licenses for importation into Ghana of Indian generic HIV-AIDS medicines[18].


CONCLUSION:
It is to be noted that while granting the license the Controller shall take into account the nature of invention, time elapsed, ability of applicant, his efforts for obtaining a license on reasonable terms. While granting a compulsory license reasonable royalty is also paid to the patentee having regard to nature of Invention, its utility, expenses incurred in maintaining patent grant in India and other factors.
Normally request for grant of Compulsory License is published and Patentee and other interested persons are afforded reasonable opportunity to defend the grant. But in case of national emergency and other urgent condition in public interest the Controller may first grant the License and then notify the Patentee and other interested persons.
Under special circumstances of medical emergency supported by notification by foreign country in this regard controller may grant compulsory license to meet the medical emergency in that country.
Also The Nexavar test case has indicated that the patent holder of vital drugs will be subjected to more scrutiny by major stakeholders of the public health system in the coming months. The patent holder will be forced to act on their patents to benefit people rather than use the rights to price such products out of the reach of the thousands of patients who could potentially benefit from such innovations. The Pharmaceutical industry will have to come up with suitable mechanisms to avoid more requests of compulsory licensing and avoid a public relations disaster by seeming to act in a way to reap undue benefits at the cost of needy patients. In my opinion Indian Judiciary has taken a right step forward after all what use is an innovative drug, if it can’t help to cure patients who need it the most, will be the question that will reverberate in communities around the world after this Indian decision on Nexavar.
Though concerns are bound to rise regarding the momentum and global image of India’s and its Judicial system’s focus on innovation might be at risk, at a time when the Indian government has declared this as the “Decade of Innovation”.
Bibliography:
Online text referred:
·         http://keionline.org/node/1219
·         http://keionline.org/node/862
·         http://keionline.org/node/1384
·         www.worldtradelaw.net/doha/tripshealth.pdf


[1] Refer Page-2.
[2] Ibid
[3] At any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the sealing of a patent, any person interested may make an application to the Controller alleging that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied or that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonable price and praying for the grant of a compulsory license to work the patented invention.
[4] (hereinafter referred to as the "Application")
[5] (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
[6] eBay v MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)
[7] Where the Controller directs the patentee to grant a licence he may as incidental thereto exercise the powers set out in section 93.Its wrongly stated in the Decision as 86(4)(iv).
[8] Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,-
 (a) every patent in force at the commencement of this Act in respect of inventions relating to-
(i) substances used or capable of being used as food or as medicine or drug; shall be deemed to be endorsed with the words "Licences of right" from the commencement of this Act or from the expiration of three years from the date of sealing of the patent under the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, whichever is later
[9]  Pg 10 of the Application.
[10]  Pg no. 12-15 Compulsory License application no. 1 of 2011.
[11] (Hereinafter referred to as ‘RRP’).
[12] Voda v. Cordis Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63623 (W.D. Okla. 2006)
[13] Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (W.D. Wis. 2007)
[14] Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31328 (D. Ariz. 2009)
[15] Medtronic Somafor Danek USA, Inc. v. Globus Med., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 290 (E.D. Pa. 2009)
[16] Translated text of the actual license is available at: http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2004-December/007233.html
[17] Translated text of the actual license is available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/malaysia/arv-license.html. For more information: Chee Yoke Ling, Malaysia’s Experience in Increasing Access to Antiretroviral Drugs: Exercising the “Government Use” Option (Third World Network, IPR Series No 9, 2006), available at: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/IPR/IPRS09.pdf
[18] Text of the actual license is available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/Ghana.png